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Abstract 
Abstract 
In a series of experimental games, each of two players may choose between remuneration 
based on either private or team effort. Although at least one of the players has the subgame 
perfect equilibrium strategy to choose remuneration based on private effort, we frequently 
observe team remuneration chosen by both players. Team remuneration allows for high pay-
off for each player for cooperation, but at the same time provides individual incentives to take 
a free ride on the other player's effort. Due to significant cooperation we observe that in team 
remuneration participants make higher profits than in private remuneration. We also observe 
that, when participants are not given the option of private remuneration, they cooperate sig-
nificantly less. 
Keywords: Team effort, voluntary collaboration, experimental economics 
JEL classification: C72, C90, H41, J33 
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1 Introduction 
The mere mention of teams and team compensation can make a human resources 
manager quiver with emotion. (Lazear 1996, p. 47) 
1 Introduction 
The study of the performance of incentive schemes is crucial for the understanding how or-
ganizations form and function (Holmstrom 1982). To foster team effort, many firms use team 
incentive schemes that account for a small portion of employee income (Milgrom and Roberts 
1992). Following Lazear (1996), there are good reasons to suppose that team incentive sche-
mes are more effective than individual incentive schemes in inducing high employee effort, in 
particular when the measurement of individual contributions is impossible or very costly. On 
the other hand, team incentive schemes are likely to induce free-riding behavior (e.g., Alchian 
and Demsetz 1972, Holmstrom 1982).  
Team incentive schemes are typically based on profit sharing: employees are paid annual 
bonuses that vary with profitability defined at the overall corporate level or at the level of an 
individual division. Several empirical studies find evidence that profit sharing is associated 
with higher productivity (for an overview see OECD 1995) and better financial performance 
of firms (e.g., Mitchell, Lewin and Lawler 1990 for the US, Zhuang and Xu 1996 for China, 
Bhargava 1994 for the UK, and Kraft and Ugarkovic 2006 for Germany.) 
An extreme form of profit sharing is when employees own all of the company as, for exam-
ple, in partnerships that are typical in law, medicine, management consulting or architecture, 
or in production cooperatives. There is a huge body of literature on worker-owned firms, both 
theoretical and empirical. The latter suggests that producer cooperatives tend to enjoy higher 
levels of productivity than conventional firms (e.g., Bonin, Jones and Putterman 1993.) 
Putterman and Skillman (1992) present a theoretical model of effort choice in a cooperative 
firm in which they examine the role of exit costs in order to reconcile the seemingly contra-
dictory lines of reasoning by MacLeod (1988) and Lin (1990). MacLeod argues that repetition 
of the production relationship in a cooperative allows for the use of trigger strategies to pun-
ish deviations from efficient output. He points out that worker mobility might hamper threats 
of future punishment and thus calls for exit costs as an important criterion for a successful 
cooperative. Lin, on the other hand, suggests that effective cooperation depends on the free-
dom to exit. She argues “that high-effort outcomes were achieved in Chinese farm coopera-
tives prior to 1958 because members enjoyed the right to return to private farming at will, and 
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could thus credibly use the threat of exit to deter shirking by fellow team members. When, by 
Lin’s account, individual rights of withdrawal were removed in 1958, productivity dropped 
sharply” (Putterman and Skillman 1992, page 598.)  
Another aspect, implicit in Lin’s argument, is that prior to 1958 participation was voluntary, 
while later on it was enforced. In psychology, reactance is defined as an emotional reaction in 
direct contradiction to rules and/or regulations that threaten or eliminate specific behavioral 
freedoms (e.g., Baron, Byrne and Branscombe 2006, page 152, and Brehm 1966). In the case 
of enforced cooperation without any option of exit, this kind of reaction could arise and ham-
per the cooperative effort. This could have been one of the reasons for the failure of the labor-
managed firm created in former Yugoslavia, which has attracted of lot of attention in the 
1960s and 1970s. 
In this paper, we examine the behavioral difference in voluntary versus enforced collaboration 
in a series of experiments on team effort under profit sharing. In the voluntary collaboration 
experiments we allow, in keeping with Lin’s line of reasoning, the choice to renounce team 
effort. We address several questions. Our major interest is whether teaming should be volun-
tary or enforced by management. Thus, we compare an environment where employees can 
choose between private and team remuneration to one where they have no choice but to work 
under team remuneration. We hypothesize that voluntary team effort is greater than enforced 
team effort because when subjects voluntarily choose team remuneration they signal interest 
in cooperation. Note that we do not examine whether team incentive schemes are more effec-
tive than private incentive schemes.  
In our experiments, pairs of participants have to provide costly effort over 30 periods. In each 
period, each participant individually chooses an effort as an integer number between 0 and 
100. Effort costs are represented by a quadratic function. In an environment where teaming is 
enforced, a participant’s remuneration is based on the average of the participant's own effort 
and the effort of the participant he or she is paired with. In an environment where teaming is 
voluntary, each participant chooses between private or team remuneration before deciding on 
the effort in each period. While private remuneration is based on the participant's individual 
effort only, team remuneration is based on the average of the participant's own effort and the 
effort of his or her team member.  
In the case of team remuneration, each of the two participants faces an individual incentive to 
take a free ride on the other's effort. The effort of each participant may be considered a volun-
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tary contribution to the public good team effort. We have modeled the situation such that 
through cooperation the team can realize higher profits than the maximum sum of profits that 
the two players can realize under private remuneration. This is based on the assumption of a 
higher payment per effort unit under team remuneration than under private remuneration, 
reflecting that in the case of team remuneration the firm has a cost advantage relative to the 
case of private remuneration due to reduced monitoring costs. In real life, effort can hardly be 
measured so that incentive payment has to be based on a surrogate, typically an output vari-
able. In a work team it is often very hard to measure an individual’s contribution to the team 
output. 
While there is a large theoretical literature on team incentives when individual effort is not 
observable (e.g., Holmstrom 1982, Rasmusen 1987, Itoh 1991, 1992, McAfee and McMillan 
1991), only few empirical studies have examined the impact of teams on output (e.g., Weitz-
man and Kruse 1990 and Hamilton, Nickerson and Owan 2003, and the references therein). 
While data at the firm level may be available, they might not allow for the comparison of 
outcomes with and without team incentives, or of voluntary and enforced teaming. Compari-
sons across firms are likely to suffer from issues of worker self-selection and distorting fac-
tors due to additional differences in human resource and production processes. Thus, con-
trolled laboratory experiments are a valuable method to collect data.  
Nalbantian and Schotter (1997), for example, present an experimental analysis of the func-
tionality of various team incentive schemes. Their revenue sharing scheme is very similar to 
our team remuneration scheme with profit sharing, except for a stochastic element in their 
experiment. More concretely, their participants face a moral hazard problem, while in our 
experiment effort is observable and verifiable. Both experiments, however, involve a free-
riding incentive. Nalbantian and Schotter observe declining effort over time, i.e., an increase 
in free riding behavior.  
In the experimental economics literature, we find a large number of studies on voluntary con-
tributions to finance a public good to which our experiment relates (e.g., Isaac, Walker and 
Williams 1994, Andreoni 1988, 1995). These studies provide a good picture of the kind of 
environments that are needed to facilitate cooperation and of the behavioral dynamics. The 
most important finding is that people do make voluntary contributions above those that are in 
their egoistic individual interest and that their contribution decisions tend to be based on the 
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reciprocity principle or, in other words, conditional cooperation (e.g., Keser and van Winden 
2000, Keser 2000, 2002, Fehr and Gächter 2000a, Fischbacher, Gächter and Fehr 2001).  
In the majority of experiments, including those by Nalbantian and Schotter, participants are 
told that they are members of a team or a group. They cannot choose whether to be in a group 
or select the group or individual group members (with the exception of Ehrhart and Keser 
1999, Hauk and Nagel 2001, Hauk 2003, Coricelli, Fehr and Fellner 2004, Page, Putterman 
and Unel 2005, Charness and Yang 2007). It is an important point of our investigation 
whether participants, when they have the choice of either private or team remuneration, will 
choose team remuneration at all. We have parameterized our experimental games such that in 
the subgame-perfect equilibrium participants choose private remuneration although social 
efficiency would require them to choose team remuneration. 
The subsequent question then is whether participants do provide cooperative efforts when 
they have chosen team remuneration. The above mentioned signaling argument would say 
yes. Theoretically, signaling relates to a forward induction argument rather than the backward 
induction on which the subgame perfect equilibrium is built. The next question then pertains 
to dynamics in the decision making, which could not only affect effort but also remuneration 
choices. 
To evaluate the robustness of our observations with respect to the choice of the remuneration 
mode and effort, we examine both a symmetric and an asymmetric parameterization of our 
game. Asymmetry in the players’ effort costs makes the definition of a cooperative goal more 
difficult (e.g., Selten, Mitzkewitz and Uhlich 1997). It reflects heterogeneity of the team 
members, an aspect that is often neglected in experimental investigations that tend to focus on 
symmetric situations. Different effort costs can reflect diverse abilities or skills among team 
members. They can also reflect diverse organizational cultures coming together after merger. 
The understanding of divergent behavior in symmetric and asymmetric team situations is an 
important human capital management issue. Abramson et al. (2002), for example, argue that 
increased attention to differences and how individuals from different backgrounds work to-
gether is necessary to create workplaces in which employees work together in a cooperative, 
productive manner.1
                                                                          
1 It is sometimes argued that worker heterogeneity in teams leads to better team outcomes due to mutual learning 
and complementarities (Hamilton, Nickerson and Owan 2003, Surwiecki 2005). Our experimental design, how-
ever, does not allow for such effects. 
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Finally, we point out that our experiments are based on games that have a social optimum in 
the interior of the strategy space. This is different from the typical experiment on public-
goods provision where the efficient solution lies at the upper end of the strategy space. It has 
been neglected in the literature that this design issue renders the observation of an aggregate 
outcome close to the efficient solution almost impossible.   
In Section 2, we present the model and its theoretical solutions. Section 3 develops behavioral 
predictions. Section 4 describes the experimental design. In Sections 5 and 6, we present the 
experimental results. Section 7 concludes the article. 
2 The  model 
Our experiments with voluntary choice of the remuneration mode are based on the effort 
game presented in Section 2.1. This game has a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium (Section 
2.2) that is different from the joint profit-maximizing solution (Section 2.3).  
2.1  The effort game 
Consider a game with two players i = 1, 2 and two decision stages. Let us start by describing 
the second decision stage in which each of the two players chooses an effort level, before we 
consider the first stage in which the players decide on their remuneration mode. 
In the second decision stage, each player i knows the remuneration mode and independently 
chooses an effort level, ei, where ei ∈ [0,100]. Effort is costly. Player i's cost function Ci de-
pends on his individual effort ei and a constant ki, and is quadratic: 
Ck e ii =
2
i .  
In the first decision stage, each player i independently chooses between private remuneration 
or team remuneration. If both players choose team remuneration, team remuneration is ap-
plied: each player i is paid, at the end of the second decision stage, based on both players' 
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If at least one of the players chooses private remuneration, private remuneration is applied: 
each player i is paid at the end of the second decision stage, based on his private effort multi-
plied by a constant, p. The private remuneration Pi for each player i is 
Pp e ii = .  
Note that we assume t > p. This reflects that in the case of team remuneration the firm has a 
cost advantage relative to the case of private remuneration due to reduced monitoring costs. 
The effort game ends at the conclusion of the second decision stage. Player i's profit Πi is 
determined by his remuneration minus his individual cost of effort: 
Πii PC =− i
i
i
  in the case of private remuneration 
Πii TC =−  in the case of team remuneration 
2.2  The subgame-perfect equilibrium 
The subgame-perfect equilibrium of the effort game can be found by backward induction. We 
start by considering the second decision stage in which each player chooses a profit-
maximizing effort level. We have to distinguish whether private or team remuneration ap-
plies, which depends on the players’ choices in the first stage.   
In the case of private remuneration, each player i solves an individual profit-maximization 
problem that is independent of the other player's effort choice: 




















In the case of team remuneration, each of the two players, i = 1, 2, independently chooses his 
effort to maximize his individual profit, taking the other player's effort into account: 
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The solution is independent of the other player's effort and, thus, implies the following domi-














e ** ** ** =+
42
,     with i = 1, 2 and  j = 3 - i. 
Consider, now, the first stage of the effort game taking the above solutions into account. If 
Πi** > Πi*, then player i chooses team remuneration; if Πi ** < Πi*, then player i chooses 
private remuneration. If player i is indifferent regarding team and private remuneration, we 
assume that player i chooses private remuneration. Only when both players choose team re-
muneration does the subgame-perfect equilibrium predict team remuneration; in all other 
cases, it predicts private remuneration.  
2.3  Joint profit maximization 
In the case of team remuneration, the two players find themselves in a kind of prisoner's- 
dilemma situation: their efforts represent voluntary contributions to the public good team 
effort. To some extent, each player has an incentive to take a free ride on the effort of the 
other player. The effort levels predicted by the equilibrium in dominant strategies are not 
optimal for the team. We find Pareto-optimal team-effort levels by solving the joint profit-
maximization problem:2






, () +− −  









                                                                          
2 We equally weigh both players’ profits. By using different weights we find other Pareto optimal solutions. 
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 with  i = 1, 2 and  j = 3 - i.  
As t > p, it follows that ei' > ei* and Πi' > Πi*. Thus, we have a Pareto-optimal solution for the 
effort game in which both players choose team remuneration and the effort ei'. 
3 Predictions 
We develop a number of theoretical and behavioral predictions to be tested in the experi-
ments. 
Prediction 1: Participants do not choose the team remuneration mode when it is in their 
egoistic self-interest to choose private remuneration. 
This follows directly from the subgame perfect equilibrium prediction derived above. 
Prediction 2: Under private remuneration, participants choose the optimal effort level. 
Under private remuneration, participants make an individual decision without strategic inter-
actions. Their profit-maximizing effort can be directly read from a table in the instructions, 
which provides the respective cost and profit for each effort level (see Appendix). 
The following three behavioral predictions relate to cases in which, contrary to the  theoretical 
prediction 1, both participants have chosen team remuneration. 
Prediction 3:  Under team remuneration, participants choose an effort above the equilib-
rium prediction. 
Under team remuneration, participants are in a decision situation that is strategically equiva-
lent to making a voluntary contribution to the provision of a public good. Over-provision 
relative to the dominant strategy prediction is a stylized fact (e.g., Ledyard 1995). 
Prediction 4:  Participants choose higher team effort under voluntary teaming than under 
enforced teaming where participants do not have the choice of private remu-
neration. 
This is due to a forward-induction argument (Kohlberg and Mertens 1986, Cho and Kreps 
1987, Van Damme 1989) rather than the backward-induction argument on which the subgame 
  8Discussion Papers   745 
4 Experimental design 
perfect equilibrium is built. Participants who choose team remuneration are assumed to signal 
an interest in earning more than under private remuneration. In the case that the subgame-
perfect equilibrium predicts private remuneration, this implies that participants who choose 
team remuneration intend to choose a higher effort than the equilibrium effort, or in other 
words, they intend to play more cooperatively than predicted. Assume that the population of 
participants consists of a constant proportion of “free riders”—participants who prefer to play 
the equilibrium strategy under team remuneration—and “cooperators”—participants who 
prefer to cooperate under team remuneration. This implies a self-selected group of coopera-
tors in voluntary teaming, while the participants in enforced teaming are represented by the 
entire population that includes the constant proportion of free riders. Thus, we expect a higher 
level of cooperation in voluntary teaming than in enforced teaming. 
Prediction 5:  Participants’ behavior is driven by reciprocity.  
A motivational definition of reciprocity has been given by Rabin (1998). If somebody is nice 
to you or others, you are inclined to be nice to him; if somebody is mean to you or others, you 
are inclined to be mean to him. Many public-goods experiments provide evidence in favor of 
reciprocity. In our game, reciprocity can show both in the level of team effort and in the choi-
ce of the remuneration mode.  In particular, the choice of private remuneration after teaming 
can be a kind of negative reciprocity (punishment) in response to uncooperative team effort 
by the other player. 
4 Experimental  design 
To test the above predictions we design several experimental treatments that are specified in 
Section 4.1. Section 4.2 describes the organization of the experiments. 
4.1 Treatments 
In a 2 x 2 treatment design, we examine the four combinations resulting from two different 
parameterizations and two structural variants of the effort game. The two parameterizations 
are symmetric (SYM), where the two players have the same parameters, and asymmetric 
(ASYM), where the two players have different effort costs. Most public-goods experiments 
examine symmetric parameterizations. The asymmetric parameterization allows us to exam-
ine the robustness of the behaviors with respect to the five predictions. 
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The two structural variants are voluntary teaming (VOLUNTARY), which is exactly the effort 
game described above, and enforced teaming (ENFORCED), where the players play only the 
second stage of the game in enforced team remuneration. This allows us to investigate Predic-
tion 4, which says that participants choose higher team effort under voluntary teaming than 
under enforced teaming. For each of the four treatments we have eight independent observa-
tions, based on eight pairs of two participants each.  
Table 1 presents the parameters used in the SYM and ASYM treatments and the theoretical 
predictions for the second stage of the game in each of the two parameterizations. Note that in 
the case of team remuneration the second stage has the nature of a voluntary-contribution-to-
a-public-good game where both the dominant strategy solution and the optimum (joint profit-
maximizing solution) lie in the interior of the strategy space.  
Table 1 
Parameter values and theoretical predictions for the second stage of the game 
Treatment  ki ei*  ei**  ei'  Πi*  Πi**  Πi' 
SYM         
i = 1, 2 
p = 9, t = 10 
1/10  45 25 50  202.5  187.5  250 
ASYM         
i = 1 (low cost)  1/10  35  20  40  122.5  104  128 
i = 2 (high cost) 
p = 7, t = 8 
1/8 28 16 32 98  112  160 
ei* player  i’s optimal effort under private remuneration 
ei** player  i’s equilibrium effort (dominant strategy) under team remuneration 
ei' player  i’s joint profit-maximizing effort under team remuneration 
Πi* player  i’s maximum profit under private remuneration 
Πi** player  i’s equilibrium profit under team remuneration 
Πi' player  i’s profit in the joint profit-maximizing solution under team remuneration 
p  factor of private remuneration 
t  factor of team remuneration 
ki  individual cost factor 
 
In the SYM parameterization, each player's maximal profit in the case of private remuneration 
is larger than his equilibrium profit in the case of team remuneration. It follows that in the 
subgame perfect equilibrium solution of the symmetric effort game both players choose pri-
vate remuneration and an effort of 45. This yields a profit of 202.5 to each player. However, if 
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both players choose team remuneration and an effort of 50 they can make a profit as high as 
250 each. This solution maximizes the sum of profits of both players in the group.  
In the ASYM parameterization, the player with the lower effort cost, player 1, makes a maxi-
mum profit in the case of private remuneration that is larger than his equilibrium profit in the 
case of team remuneration, while the opposite is true for the player with the higher effort cost, 
player 2. Thus, in the subgame perfect equilibrium solution private remuneration will be real-
ized. The low-cost player chooses an effort of 35 and makes a profit of 122.5, while the high-
cost player chooses an effort of 28 and makes a profit of 98. Each of the two players can do 
better by choosing team remuneration and an effort of 40 by the low-cost player and 32 by the 
high-cost player. In this Pareto optimal solution, the low-cost player’s profit is 128 while the 
high-cost player’s profit is 160, which implies that the high-cost player makes a higher profit 
than the low-cost player. As each of the two players has an incentive to individually deviate, 
this Pareto optimal solution does not describe an equilibrium of the second stage subgame. 
4.2 Organization 
In the experiments, participants played 30 repetitions, called periods, of the effort game in 
two-player groups that remained unchanged during the entire experiment (“partners” design). 
Based again on the backward induction principle, the subgame perfect equilibrium prediction 
of the finitely repeated effort game prescribes in each period the subgame perfect equilibrium 
prediction presented above. Behaviorally, however, the repetition opens up room for recipro-
cal behavior or conditional cooperation.  
In the beginning of the second decision stage, in the VOLUNTARY treatments, each partici-
pant was informed of the actual remuneration mode, depending on both players’ decisions in 
the first stage. At the end of each period, each participant was informed about his or her indi-
vidual profit. In the case of team remuneration also the average effort level (and, thus, impli-
citly the effort level chosen by the other player) was communicated to each participant. A 
participant’s sum of profits in all 30 periods determined his or her individual earnings in the 
experiment. 
The computerized experiments were run at the experimental economics laboratory at 
CIRANO-LUB (Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des Organisations – Labo-
ratoires Universitaires Bell) in Montréal. We conducted sessions with eight participants each. 
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In the beginning of a session, the participants were randomly and anonymously assigned into 
four two-player groups, and, in the ASYM treatments, they were also randomly allocated the 
role of either a low-cost or a high-cost player for the entire experiment. 
Participants received written instructions (an English translation can be found in the Appen-
dix, the French version is available upon request), which were also read aloud to them. Before 
the experiment could start, each participant had to provide correct answers to a number of 
questions regarding the understanding of the instructions. Participants were not allowed to 
communicate with each other during the entire experiment. They did not know with whom 
they interacted among the other participants. After the experiment, each participant was paid 
in privacy based on his or her individual earnings in the experiment plus a show-up fee. The 
individual earnings were converted into Canadian dollars with a factor announced in the ex-
periment instructions. On average, participants earned 30 Canadian dollars, including the 
show-up fee, for a session that lasted about 90 minutes. 
5 Experimental  results 
In this section we evaluate, based on non-parametric data analysis, the five predictions made 
in Section 3 above. Each pair of participants forming a two-player group represents an inde-
pendent observation. Unless mentioned otherwise, all non-parametric tests are two-sided. If 
no significance level is given, we require significance at the 10-percent level. We denote the 
Wilcoxon signed ranks test as Wilcoxon test and the Man-Whitney u-test as u-test.  
Prediction 1: Participants do not choose the team remuneration mode when it is in their 
egoistic self-interest to choose private remuneration. 
In the VOLUNTARY SYM treatment, team remuneration is chosen by both players and thus 
realized in 45 percent of all periods.3 This is in sharp contrast to the subgame-perfect equilib-
rium of the game with its specific paremeterization. Comparing the first set of 15 periods to 
the final set of 15 periods, the relative frequency of team remuneration exhibits no tendency 
to increase or decrease over time (Wilcoxon test). 
                                                                          
3 In 34 percent of all periods both players choose private remuneration, while in 21 percent of all periods private 
remuneration is realized due to one player choosing team remuneration but the other player choosing private 
remuneration. 
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In the VOLUNTARY ASYM treatment, team remuneration is chosen by both players and thus 
realized in as many as 72 percent of all periods. Again, this is in sharp contrast to the sub-
game-perfect equilibrium of the game with its specific parametrization.  The relative frequen-
cy of team remuneration in this treatment exhibits a tendency to increase over time. When we 
compare the first set of 15 periods to the last set of 15 periods, we observe an increase that is 
significant at the 5-percent level (Wilcoxon test). 
In the subgame-perfect equilibrium of the VOLUNTARY ASYM treatment only the high-cost 
player has an interest in choosing team remuneration. Thus, we hypothesize that high-cost 
players tend to choose team remuneration more often than low-cost players. We find support 
for this hypothesis in that the high-cost players chose team remuneration in 89 percent of all 
periods while the low-cost players chose team remuneration in 78 percent of all periods. In six 
of the eight independent groups the high-cost player chooses team remuneration more often 
than the low-cost player. This replicates the empirical finding of Hamilton, Nickerson and 
Owan (2003).  
Conclusion 1: Participants do choose team remuneration, contradictory to the subgame-
perfect equilibrium solution of the game. 
Prediction 2: Participants choose the optimal effort level under private remuneration. 
In the VOLUNTARY SYM treatment, the average effort over all periods with private remunera-
tion is 45.27 (standard deviation of 16.81) and is not significantly different from 45, the opti-
mal effort in the case of private remuneration (binomial test). This might be interpreted as 
evidence in favor of the participants' rationality. However, only about one half (52 percent) of 
all individual decisions under private remuneration are exactly 45. Participants tend to learn 
the optimal effort, though: the percentage of optimal private-effort choices increases from 47 
in the first set of 15 periods to 63 in the last set of 15 periods. This increase is significant at 
the 10-percent level (Wilcoxon test).  
In the VOLUNTARY ASYM treatment, the average private effort of the low-cost players is 
34.87 (standard deviation of 9.88), which is not significantly different from the optimal level 
of 35 (binomial test), and the average private effort of the high-cost players is 27.22 (standard 
deviation of 15.58), which is not significantly different from the optimal level of 28 (binomial 
test). However, on the aggregate, only 51 percent of the effort choices by the low-cost players 
and 46 of those by the high-cost players are optimal. Pooling low-cost and high-cost players 
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due to only four independent observations in each category, we observe that participants learn 
the optimal private effort: from the first set of 15 periods to the last set of 15 periods, the 
percentage of optimal choices significantly increases (Wilcoxon test, 10-percent significance). 
Conclusion 2: On the aggregate, participants choose the optimal private effort. However, 
only about 50 percent of the individual choices are optimal. The percentage of 
optimal choices shows a significant tendency to increase over time. 
Prediction 3:  Under team remuneration, participants choose an effort above the equilib-
rium prediction. 
In the VOLUNTARY SYM treatment, the average effort over all periods with team remunera-
tion is 50.10 (standard deviation of 17.34) and significantly above 25, the dominant strategy 
in the case of team remuneration (binomial test, 5-percent significance).4 Thus, in the case of 
team remuneration, our experimental evidence is similar to the results in public-goods ex-
periments: effort is higher than predicted by the game-theoretical solution.  
Interestingly, the observed effort is not significantly different from the Pareto optimum of 50 
(Wilcoxon test). Note that in our experimental game, in contrast to most public-goods expe-
riments, the optimum lies in the interior of the strategy space. If the Pareto optimum lies at the 
upper limit of the strategy space, participants can never err around it: deviations from the 
Pareto optimum are always below. This raises the concern whether it is due to this design 
issue that in most public-goods experiments contributions, although higher than in equilibri-
um, are still far below the Pareto optimum (see the related discussion on corner equilibria in 
Andreoni 1995, Ledyard 1995, Keser 1996, and Sefton and Steinberg 1996). Our experimen-
tal results give support to this concern as they show that, on the aggregate, participants make 
efforts right at the Pareto-optimal level. This implies that effort levels above the optimum 
have been chosen to the same extent as those below.   
Over all periods, the resulting average profit in team remuneration is 220.08 and significantly 
higher than in private remuneration, where it is 174.35 (Wilcoxon test, 10-percent signifi-
                                                                          
4 From the first set of 15 periods to the last set of 15 periods, we observe no significant increase or decrease in 
the team effort, but a decrease in its standard deviation from 20.54 to 11.91 (Wilcoxon test, 5-percent signifi-
cance) signaling a larger cooperative consensus over time. 
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cance).5 The average profit in team remuneration is significantly below the optimal profit of 
250 (Wilcoxon test) and not significantly different from the equilibrium profit of 187.5. 
In the VOLUNTARY ASYM treatment, the average team effort of the low-cost players is 34.51 
(standard deviation of 11.09), while the average team effort of the high-cost players is 30.14 
(standard deviation of 8.01).6 Both effort levels are significantly above the respective domi-
nant strategy of 20 or 16 (binomial test, 1-percent significance). Requiring significance at the 
10-percent level (Wilcoxon test), both effort levels are not significantly different from the 
Pareto optimum of 40 and 32, respectively. Furthermore, neither the low-cost players’ avera-
ge effort nor its standard deviation is significantly different from the respective value of the 
high-cost players (Wilcoxon test).  
The resulting average profit of the low-cost players (127.26, standard deviation of 74.05) is 
not significantly different from the one of the high-cost players (137.1, standard deviation of 
59.85) in team remuneration (Wilcoxon test).7 While the high-cost players’ average profit is 
significantly above their equilibrium profit (Wilcoxon test, 5-percent significance), the low-
cost players’ average profit is not significantly different from their equilibrium profit (Wil-
coxon test). Both low-cost and high-cost players’ profits are not significantly different from 
their respective joint profit-maximizing profit (Wilcoxon test): the low-cost players realize 99 
percent and the high-cost players realize 86 percent of it.  
The high-cost players’ average profit is significantly higher in team remuneration than in 
private remuneration, where it is 68.06 (Wilcoxon test, 2-percent significance). The low-cost 
players’ average profit is in six of the eight groups higher in team remuneration than in priva-
te remuneration. However, this difference is statistically not significant (Wilcoxon test). The 
low-cost players’ profit under private remuneration is 112.89 on average.  
                                                                          
5 We observe no significant increase or decrease of profit from the first set of 15 periods to the last set of 15 
periods, neither in team nor in private remuneration. The standard deviation, however, decreases from 165.34 to 
81.31 in team remuneration (Wilcoxon test, 10-percent significance) and from 51.89 to 22.25 in private remunera-
tion (Wilcoxon, 5-percent significance). 
6 Comparing the average team effort in the first set of 15 periods to that in the final set of 15 periods, we observe 
a decrease both for the low-cost and the high-cost players. Neither is statistically significant (Wilcoxon test) al-
though the decrease of the low-cost players’ effort just fails significance. 
7 The profit of the low-cost players tends to increase from the first set of 15 periods to the last set of 15 periods 
under team remuneration (Wilcoxon test, 5-percent significance). The profit of the high-cost players shows no 
tendency to increase or decrease under team remuneration (Wilcoxon test). 
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Conclusion 3: Participants do choose team effort that is above the equilibrium prediction. 
They do not realize profits, though, that are significantly higher than the equi-
librium profits—with the exception of the high-cost players. 
Prediction 4:  Participants choose higher team effort under voluntary teaming than under 
enforced teaming. 
Comparing average effort in the ENFORCED SYM to that in the VOLUNTARY SYM treat-
ment, we observe that under enforced teaming effort is 35.68 (standard deviation of 19.45) 
and, thus, significantly lower than under voluntary teaming where it is 50.10 (u-test, 5-percent 
significance).8 Initially, however there is no statistically significant difference: enforced team 
effort in the first period is 41.88; whereas, voluntary team effort in the first period that team 
remuneration is realized is 45.00 (u-test). 
Enforced team effort is significantly above the equilibrium effort of 25 (Wilcoxon test, 5-
percent significance) and significantly below the joint profit-maximizing effort of 50 (Wil-
coxon test, 2-percent significance). Recall that, in contrast to this latter result, voluntary team 
effort is not significantly different from 50. 
Figure 1 compares the density of voluntary and enforced team effort. While we rarely observe 
enforced effort above the joint profit-maximizing level of 50 (15 percent of all observations 
above 50, 72 percent below), voluntary effort seems to be allocated around 50 (37 percent of 
all observations above, 38 below). Effort levels above 50 might be used as a signal for one’s 
willingness to cooperate with the other, in particular if one expects the other to make an effort 
below 50 in the current period.9 But, they could also simply be due to random decision mak-
ing and/or misunderstanding of the payoff function. The latter is unlikely to account for the 
majority of the observations above 50 in the voluntary teaming treatment as we observe only 
relatively few effort choices above 50 in the enforced teaming treatment. It could be seen as 
an unfortunate drawback of our experimental design that the middle of the strategy space 
coincides with the joint profit-maximizing effort, as in some cases participants might have 
just gone toward the middle of the strategy space. However, as will be seen below, this midd-
                                                                          
8 Similar to the voluntary team effort, enforced team effort shows neither a statistically significant decrease nor a 
statistically significant increase from the first set of set of 15 periods to the second set of set of 15 periods, nor 
does its standard deviation (Wilcoxon tests). 
9 The payoff function is relatively flat around the optimum so that the cost of going slightly above it is not very 
high. 
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le point was not chosen in the asymmetric cases. Note that when the Pareto optimum lies at 
the border of the strategy space so that participants have no opportunity to go above, either 
intentionally or erroneously, this might cause the observed cooperation level to lie much 
further below the Pareto optimum than it would otherwise.  
Figure 1 






























The average profit under enforced teaming is 191.73 (standard deviation of 120.56). It is 
significantly higher than the team equilibrium profit of 187.5 (Wilcoxon test, 5-percent signi-
ficance), but lower than the joint profit-maximizing profit of 250 (Wilcoxon test, 2-percent 
significance). It is also lower than the average profit of 220.08 under voluntary teaming; but 
this difference is statistically not significant (u-test). The standard deviations of effort and 
profit, such as the absolute difference between the two players’ effort levels are not signifi-
cantly different between the two treatments.  
Comparing average effort and profit levels in the ENFORCED ASYM treatment to those in the 
VOLUNTARY ASYM treatment, we observe that the profit of 75.98 (standard deviation of 
151.41) of the high-cost player in the ENFORCED ASYM treatment is significantly lower than 
in the VOLUNTARY ASYM treatment (u-test, 2-percent significance). Also, the standard de-
viation of the high-cost players’ team effort is higher in the enforced treatment (21.67) than in 
the voluntary treatment (u-test, 10-percent significance). All other variables in the EN-
FORCED ASYM treatment, the low-cost players’ effort (31.14) and its standard deviation 
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(17.78), the high-cost players’ effort (29.32), the low-cost players’ profit (113.38), its stan-
dard deviation (98.53), and the difference of the low-cost minus the high-cost players’ effort 
are not significantly different from the respective value in the VOLUNTARY ASYM treatment. 
Effort and profit of the low-cost players are not significantly different from those of the high-
cost players (Wilcoxon tests).  
The low-cost players’ effort is significantly above their equilibrium effort and significantly 
below their joint profit-maximizing effort (Wilcoxon tests, 5-percent significance). Recalling 
that in voluntary teaming the low-cost players’ effort is not significantly different from their 
joint profit-maximizing effort, we have thus got indirect evidence for higher effort by the 
low-cost players in voluntary teaming compared to enforced teaming. The high-cost players’ 
effort is significantly above their equilibrium effort but not significantly different from their 
joint profit-maximizing effort. This is similar to what we observe under voluntary teaming.10
Figures 2a and 2b show the density of team effort of the low- and the high-cost players, re-
spectively, under enforced and voluntary teaming. We see that under voluntary teaming the 
observed effort levels are much less spread out than under enforced teaming.  
The low-cost players’ profit is significantly different neither from their equilibrium profit nor 
from their joint profit-maximizing payoff, while the high-cost players’ payoff is not signifi-
cantly different from their equilibrium payoff but significantly below their joint profit-
maximizing payoff (Wilcoxon test, 2-percent significance). In contrast to this, under volun-
tary teaming the high-cost players’ payoff is not significantly different from their joint profit-
maximizing payoff.  
Conclusion 4: In the SYM treatment, we observe voluntary team effort that is higher than 
enforced team effort. In the ASYM treatment, we observe less standard devia-
tion of the team effort choices by the high-cost players if teaming is voluntary 
rather than enforced. It is only the high-cost players in the ASYM treatment 
who gain a higher profit under voluntary teaming than under enforced team-
ing. 
Prediction 5:  Participants’ behavior is driven by reciprocity.  
                                                                          
10 When we compare the first set of 15 periods to the last set of 15 periods, for neither player type, neither effort 
nor profit shows a significant tendency to decrease or increase over time (Wilcoxon tests). The decrease in the 
low-cost players’ effort, however, just fails significance. This is similar to voluntary teaming. 
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Figure 2a 
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Reciprocity can show both in the choice of the team-effort level and in the choice of the re-
muneration mode. For the choice of team effort, we define reciprocity as in the public-goods 
literature. Specifically, we interpret participants' voluntary contributions in terms of condi-
tional cooperation, following Keser and van Winden (2000): when a player changes his effort 
from one period to the next, he increases the effort if in the previous period he contributed a 
lower effort than the other player but decreases it if in the previous period he contributed a 
higher effort than the other player.  
In the VOLUNTARY SYM treatment, considering all the observations where the realization of 
team remuneration followed team remuneration and where the two players’ efforts were dif-
ferent in the previous period, we identify seven groups that obeyed this reciprocity rule in the 
majority of cases; only one group did not follow this rule of reciprocity in the majority of 
cases. Similarly, in the ENFORCED SYM treatment, we identify seven of the eight groups 
that follow the rule of reciprocity in the majority of cases. Thus, participants show in both 
SYM treatments a significant tendency to follow this specific rule of reciprocity (binomial 
tests, 10 -percent significance).  
In the VOLUNTARY ASYM treatment, considering all cases where team remuneration fol-
lowed team remuneration and where the two players’ efforts were different in the previous 
period, we observe that the low-cost players, if they change their effort from one period to the 
next, show a significant tendency to increase their effort if they contributed less in the previ-
ous period and to decrease it if they contributed more in the previous period (binomial test, 5 -
percent significance). The high-cost players do not show this kind of reciprocal behavior. In 
the ENFORCED ASYM treatment, we find that neither the low nor the high-cost players show 
a significant tendency for reciprocal behavior under enforced teaming. Thus, only when team-
ing is voluntary, do we observe reciprocity in the low-cost players’ effort choices. 
With respect to the remuneration choice, our hypothesis is that participants tend to choose 
private remuneration after having chosen a higher effort than the other player in previous 
team remuneration. In other words, the choice of private remuneration can be used strategi-
cally as a kind of punishment—by ostracism or a simple rejection to interact—with the inten-
tion to enforce future cooperation. The experimental results by Fehr and Gächter (2000a) and 
Masclet et al. (2003) show that participants in public-goods experiments make use of costly 
opportunities to punish uncooperative others. Hirshleifer and Rasmusen (1989) show in a 
theoretical paper that a way to enforce cooperation in a finitely repeated n-person prisoners’ 
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dilemma game is ostracism: players who defect are expelled. Closely related to that theoreti-
cal paper, Cinyabugama, Page and Putterman (2005) show in an experiment that the threat of 
costly expulsion (through majority vote in the group) can induce cooperation in a public-
goods game. While these two papers consider models that allow players to expel uncoopera-
tive others, Hauk 2003 examines a game that, perhaps more closely related to our paper, pro-
vides the opportunity to opt out of a finitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma game. She finds that 
defection in early periods is punished by opting out.   
In the VOLUNTARY SYM treatment, we observe a tendency (just failing significance) to 
choose team remuneration after team remuneration was realized, or inertia with respect to the 
choice of team remuneration.11 However, after private remuneration, there is a weak tendency 
(again, just failing significance) to choose team rather than private remuneration.12 In other 
words, there is some tendency not to stay with private remuneration. This suggests that the 
choice of private remuneration can be a temporary threat rather than intended to be a long-run 
situation. 
Similarly, in the VOLUNTARY ASYM treatment, we observe a tendency to choose team remu-
neration after team remuneration was realized in the previous period. This is true for low-cost 
and for high-cost players (binomial test, 10-percent significance). In the 15 cases in which 
private remuneration was chosen (in ten of these cases it was the low-cost player, and in five 
of these cases it was the high-cost player), the player had contributed more effort than the 
other player in the previous period. After private remuneration was realized, there was no 
clear-cut tendency to choose either remuneration.  
Further support for our punishment hypothesis is given in the VOLUNTARY SYM treatment 
by the fact that in 21 out of the 30 cases in which a participant chose private remuneration 
after having experienced team remuneration in the previous period, the participant had contri-
buted more effort than the other player. In six of the groups the majority of choices of private 
remuneration after team remuneration were made after the player had contributed a higher 
effort than the other player. In one group the players who chose private remuneration after 
team remuneration had contributed a lower effort than the other player. In another group the 
                                                                          
11 After team remuneration, five groups chose team remuneration while only one group chose private remunera-
tion in more than half of all cases and one group chose team and private remuneration equally often. The latter 
two groups account for only 6.73 percent of all the cases in which team remuneration was observed in t-1. 
12 After private remuneration, five groups chose team remuneration while only two groups chose private remu-
neration in more than half of all cases and one group chose private and team remuneration equally often. 
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situation never occurred. We conclude that the choice of private remuneration after team 
remuneration tends (just failing statistical significance) to be due to the fact that the partici-
pant had contributed a higher effort than the other player.  
Conclusion 5: In both SYM treatments, we observe reciprocity in the effort choice. In the 
VOLUNTARY ASYM treatment, only the low-cost player observes the recipro-
city rule. The choice of private remuneration can be interpreted as a signal of 
disapproval of the low effort of the other player in the previous team remune-
ration mode. 
6 Regression  analysis 
In this section we complement the non-parametric data analysis presented above by a regres-
sion analysis. In Section 5.1, we examine the choice of remuneration for the VOLUNTARY 
SYM and VOLUNTARY ASYM treatments. In Section 5.2, we examine the effort choice for all 
treatments. We shall see that the parametric regression results are quantitatively and qualitati-
vely consistent with our non-parametric observations. 
6.1 Remuneration  mode 
We examine the participants’ choice of the remuneration mode in a parsimonious random 
effect probit model on the decision to choose team remuneration. The decision variable “vo-
luntary teaming” is equal to “1” if the participant chooses team remuneration and “0” other-
wise. Explanatory variables are “1
st period”, which is equal to “1” for the first period and “0” 
otherwise, and “last 5 periods”, which is equal to “1” for the last five periods and “0” other-
wise. These two dummy variables account for first-period and end-game effects. 
We also construct the explanatory variables “partner’s effort below a strategic level” and 
“partner’s effort above a strategic level” based on the following hypothesis. A participant 
chooses team remuneration if he expects to earn a higher payoff than under private remunera-
tion. Assume that he chooses his dominant strategy in team remuneration and, thus, to achieve 
a higher or equal payoff than in private remuneration, he needs a minimum effort from his 
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team partner. In the symmetric cost situation, the partner’s minimum required effort is 28.13 
In the asymmetric cost situation, the low-cost player requires from his partner a minimum 
effort of 20, while the high-cost player requires a minimum effort of 17.14 The latter require-
ment is likely to be satisfied as the low-cost player’s dominant strategy in team remuneration 
is 20 and thus above the required minimum. 
We do not expect participants to be able to compute exactly those numbers and therefore 
create the following two binary variables. “Partner’s effort above a strategic level” takes a 
value of “1” if the last time that team remuneration was realized the partner chose an effort 
larger or equal to 6 units above the required effort as determined above, or “0” otherwise. 
“Partner’s effort below a strategic level” takes a value of “1” if the last time that team remu-
neration was realized the partner chose an effort smaller or equal to six units below the requi-
red effort as determined above, or “0” otherwise. The choice of six units around the required 
minimum is arbitrary. However, analyses with other numbers around 6 have not substantially 
changed the results. 
The random effects probit regression results are presented in Table 2. In both the VOLUNTA-
RY SYM and the VOLUNTARY ASYM treatment and for both cost types, we observe that 
“partner’s effort above a strategic level” significantly increases the probability of choosing 
team remuneration. The coefficient of “partner’s effort below a strategic level,” however, is 
not statistically significant. These results indicate some kind of reciprocity, which shows in 
the participants’ choice of the remuneration mode.  
In the VOLUNTARY SYM treatment, we observe a negative end-game effect: in the final peri-
ods of the game, participants are more likely than before to choose private remuneration.  
In the VOLUNTARY ASYM treatment, we observe a significant negative first period effect in 
one specification for the low-cost player, while the variable “1
st period” is insignificant for the 
high-cost players. The latter is not surprising as the high-cost players have, according to the 
game-theoretical solution, an interest in team remuneration that is independent of the other 
                                                                          
13 The participant’s dominant strategy in the case of team remuneration is 25. We solve the following equation to 
determine the partner’s effort X that makes the participant indifferent to team and private remuneration: 203 = 
10(25 + X)/2 - (25
2/10), where 203 is the (rounded) maximum profit in private remuneration. 
14 The following equations are solved for X, respectively: (1) 123 = 8(20 + X)/2 - (20
2/10), where 123 is the low-
cost player’s (rounded) maximum profit in private remuneration and 20 his dominant strategy in team remunera-
tion. (2) 98 = 8(16 + X)/2 - (16
2/8), where 98 is the high-cost player’s maximum profit in private remuneration and 
16 his dominant strategy in team remuneration. 
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player’s effort. This is also reflected in the relatively high and statistically significant (one-tail 
test) constant for the high-cost players. While high-cost players always have an interest in 
team remuneration, it is interesting for the low-cost players only if they manage to cooperate 
with the high-cost player. 
Table 2 
Choice of team remuneration in VOLUNTARY SYM and ASYM treatments 
(Random effects probits) 
ASYM 
Low cost  High cost 
 
SYM 

















































Loglikelihood -195.045  -82,647  -85.409  -52.606 
Nobs  480 240 240 240 
*Significant at 5%; 
** Significant at 1%; one- or two-tail tests, whenever appropriate.  
(     ) Standard-error. 
a: Likelihood ratio test. 
 
6.2 Effort 
The determinants of the effort level (in the range of 0 to 100) are reported using panel regres-
sions with fixed effects for individuals and periods. Assuming fixed effects for periods and 
strategic first-period and end-game effects being unlikely to play a role in private remunerati-
on, we disregard the “1
st period” and “last 5 periods” dummies from these regressions. To 
take the remuneration mode into account, we include the dummy variable “team mode” which 
is equal to “1” if the group is in the team remuneration mode when the effort is chosen or “0” 
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otherwise. We also include the variable “effort of the partner” which is the effort chosen by 
the partner the last time that the group was in the team remuneration mode. This variable 
reflects a specific type of reciprocity, where reciprocity is defined in a strict quantitative way. 
In the non-parametric analysis of our data we used a qualitative definition for reciprocity 
based on the difference between the two players’ effort levels in the previous period. One 
difficulty with this definition in the parametric analysis of panel data would be the inclusion 
of a lagged dependent variable.  
The regression results are reported in Table 3 for VOLUNTARY teaming and in Table 4 for 
ENFORCED teaming. In the VOLUNTARY teaming treatments, nothing, except for the 
constant term, is significant at the 1 -percent or 5-percent level. The constant represents the 
participants’ effort choice in private remuneration. With 47.6 in the SYM case, 32.3 for the 
low-cost players and 29.8 for the high-cost players in the ASYM case, these values are close to 
the respective optimal values of 45, 35 and 28. In the team mode, by using all coefficients, we 
can show that the players are closer to the Pareto optimum than their respective dominant 
strategy, but the non-significant coefficients of the “team mode” and “effort of the partner” 
variables make this result relatively imprecise. In the ASYM case this is particularly true for 
the high-cost players.  
Table 3 
Choice of effort level in the VOLUNTARY SYM and ASYM treatments 
(Least squares with fixed effects for individuals and periods) 
ASYM   
SYM 























2 0.341 0.367 0.462 
Nobs  480 240 240 
* Significant at 5%; ** Significant at 1%; (     ) Standard-error. 
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Table 4 
Choice of effort level in the ENFORCED SYM and ASYM treatments 
(Least squares with fixed effect for individuals and periods) 
ASYM   
SYM 




















2 0.297 0.395 0.563 
Nobs  480 240 240 
* Significant at 5%; ** Significant at 1%; (     ) Standard-error. 
 
The fact that players do not reciprocate the previous team effort of their partner probably 
results from the first step of the game: once the players have decided for team remuneration, 
this has a signaling effect implying that they cooperate at a level they think is a reasonable 
point of cooperation.  
The results in the ENFORCED teaming treatments support this explanation. When teaming is 
enforced, the reciprocity variable “effort of the partner” has a significantly positive effect on 
the effort. Note that this result does not necessarily contradict the non-parametric result that 
reciprocity is mostly insignificant in the ASYM treatments (with the exception of the low-cost 
players under VOLUNTARY teaming). The non-parametric tests are conservative and concern 
the direction rather than the intensity of the reaction to other’s effort. Thus, the increase (dec-
rease) in units of effort given an increase (decrease) in the partner’s effort appears to be signi-
ficant although we observe almost equal numbers of increases and decreases.  
The predicted team effort levels, taking the partner’s previous team effort at mean values, are 
in all enforced treatments lower than in the respective voluntary teaming treatment. For ex-
ample, the predicted effort in the regression for the ENFORCED SYM treatment is 44.2 and, 
thus, lower than the effort level predicted for the VOLUNTARY SYM treatment.  
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In our experiments, we observe many instances of team remuneration: both players chose 
team remuneration in 45 percent of the periods in the symmetric specification of the game, 
where the two players have the subgame perfect equilibrium strategy to choose private remu-
neration, and in 72 percent of the periods in the asymmetric specification, where the player 
with the lower effort costs has the subgame-perfect equilibrium strategy to choose private 
remuneration. We also observe that under team remuneration the average effort is significant-
ly higher than predicted by the subgame perfect equilibrium. Thus, participants make higher 
profits in team remuneration than in private. They tend to stay with their choice of team re-
muneration but choose private remuneration as a short-run punishment for uncooperative 
team effort by the other participant.  
In a symmetric cost situation, we observe that voluntary teaming implies significantly higher 
effort levels than enforced teaming. However, this does not come along with a significantly 
higher efficiency, if we define efficiency as the realized percentage of the maximal team pro-
fit. The reason is that when teaming is voluntary participants choose effort levels above the 
efficient level significantly more often than when teaming is enforced. In both the voluntary 
and the enforced teaming environment, team effort is driven by a reciprocity principle: if a 
player intends to change his team effort from one period to the next, he increases (decreases) 
it if his own effort was lower (higher) than the other player’s effort.  
In an asymmetric cost situation, we do not observe statistically significant differences in the 
effort levels of the voluntary and the enforced teaming environment. We do, however, obser-
ve higher efficiency, due to larger payoffs for the high-cost players, in the voluntary teaming 
environment. The reciprocity principle defined above plays a minor role (only for the low-
cost players when teaming is voluntary). It is not obvious for the two players in the asym-
metric situation where to cooperate. 
We observe that in contrast to the theoretical prediction people build teams. They do better in 
teams than if they make individually remunerated efforts. The degree of team cooperation, 
however, depends on whether teaming is enforced or voluntary. We observe more cooperation 
in voluntary teaming than in enforced teaming. This effect is most obvious in the symmetric 
cost situation where it is relatively obvious to the team members, who cannot communicate 
other than through their decision making, where to cooperate.  
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This is in keeping with the results by Ernst Fehr and his coauthors (e.g., Gächter and Fehr 
1999, Fehr and Gächter 2000b). They provide experimental evidence that compared to com-
plete labor contracts, incomplete contracts have an advantage in that they leave room for 
cooperation between the employer and the employee.  
In our experiment there is room to “overdo” one’s effort by going beyond the individual effort 
level that would be joint profit maximizing. We observe that participants often overdo effort 
in the voluntary symmetric treatment but not in the enforced symmetric treatment. Thus, sim-
ple error making cannot be the sole explanation for choosing effort levels above the joint 
profit-maximizing level. Another explanation could be that participants are signaling that they 
are interested in cooperation. A participant who expects the other to make a very low effort 
and who wants to send a very strong signal could have an interest in making an effort above 
the joint profit-maximizing level. In the bulk of experiments on voluntary contributions to 
finance a public good this is excluded by design.  
In asymmetric experiments, where it is not so clear where cooperation should take place, the 
effort increase by voluntary teaming is not very significant. This is probably due to the rela-
tively small number of independent observations. The effect shows more clearly in that the 
voluntary team effort levels are much more contained around and between the subgame per-
fect equilibrium and the joint profit-maximizing solution than in the case of enforced teaming, 
where effort levels are spread out over the entire strategy space. Obviously, voluntary teaming 
helps participants to better coordinate than enforced teaming. Once they have agreed on team 
remuneration, participants have already made some investment by giving up on their higher 
private remuneration rate. Similar evidence has been found by Cachon and Camerer (1996), 
who observe that a fixed entry fee for subjects participating in a coordination game improves 
coordination significantly. In our experiments, considering the game-theoretical solution, it is 
in particular the low-cost players who signal a commitment to attempt cooperation by their 
choice of team remuneration. Having made that choice, they are willing to make a somewhat 
higher effort than in enforced teaming (34.51 rather than 31.14). The difference is not statisti-
cally significant, probably due to the relatively low number of independent observations. But, 
while the enforced team effort is significantly lower than the joint profit-maximizing effort, 
we observe no significant difference between the voluntary team effort and the joint profit-
maximizing effort. 
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7 Conclusion 
Our results bear relevant implications for workforce management. Teams with a strong het-
erogeneity of abilities are likely to show a relatively large dispersion of efforts. Our experi-
mental observations suggest that this dispersion can be reduced by allowing for voluntary 
teaming. In general, voluntary team effort will tend to be higher than enforced team effort. 
The effect is likely to be the stronger the less heterogeneity there is. 
Of course, voluntary teaming is just one of many ways to enhance team cooperation. From 
many previous experiments on prisoners’ dilemma type of situations, where individually 
rational behavior leads to inefficient outcomes for the group, we know that communication 
(e.g., Ostrom, Gardner and Walker 1992, 1994, Sally 1995, Brosig, Weimann, and Ockenfels 
2003), and, as discussed in Section 5 above, the opportunity to punish uncooperative others 
either financially (e.g., Fehr and Gächter 2000a, 2002, Masclet et al. 2003) or by social exclu-
sion (Hirshleifer and Rasmusen 1989, Hauk 2003, Cinyabugama, Page and Putterman 2005) 
are efficient ways to increase cooperation in teams. 
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APPENDIX 
Instructions [VOLUNTARY ASYM] 
You are participating in a decision-making experiment where you have the opportunity to 
earn money. How much money you earn depends on your own decisions, but may also de-
pend on those of other participants. 
You will make individual decisions at your computer. From now on, please do not talk with 
other participants until the end of the experiment. 
In the experiment, you will be anonymously paired with another participant to form a group 
of two. The experiment consists of 30 repetitions, called periods. You will stay in the same 
group with the same other participant during all 30 periods. In each of the periods, you will be 
in the same decision situation. 
A period consists of two decision stages. We start by describing the second stage. In this 
stage, each participant has to choose an effort, which is an integer number between 0 and 100. 
The effort incurs a cost measured in Experimental Currency Units (ECU). The two members 
in each group have different effort costs. For one of the two group members, the effort cost is 
equal to the square of the chosen effort divided by 10, while for the other, it is equal to the 
square of the chosen effort divided by 8. Tables 1 and 1A below show for the two group 
members, respectively, the cost of each effort level between 1 and 100. Zero effort implies 
zero cost.  
At the beginning of the experiment, you will find an envelope with your personal effort cost 
table at your computer terminal. One of the two members in each group will find Table 1 
(cost equals squared effort divided by 10), while the other will find Table 1A (cost equals 
squared effort divided by 8). 
In the first stage of each period, you have to choose between two modes of remuneration: a 
private remuneration mode and a joint remuneration mode. The remuneration mode will de-
termine how you will be compensated for your effort. 
•  If you choose the private remuneration mode, you will be paid 7 ECU per effort unit that 
you individually choose in the second stage. The other group member will be paid 7 ECU 
per effort unit that he or she chooses in the second stage. 
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•  If both you and the anonymous other group member choose the joint remuneration mode, 
each of you will be paid based on the average effort in your group in the second stage. 
Each of you will be paid 8 ECU per unit of the average effort by you and the other group 
member. 
•  If you choose the joint remuneration mode, but the anonymous other group member 
chooses the private remuneration mode, you will both adhere to the private remuneration 
mode. You will be paid 7 ECU per effort unit that you individually choose in the second 
stage. The other group member will be paid 7 ECU per effort unit that he or she chooses in 
the second stage. 
Your earnings 
Your profit (in ECU) in a period is determined as follows. 
•  If you are in the private remuneration mode, your profit is determined by your individual 
effort multiplied by 7 ECU minus the cost of your individual effort in ECU. Below you 
find Table 2 (cost equals squared effort divided by 10) and 2A (cost equals squared effort 
divided by 8) that show for each level of individual effort the corresponding cost and the 
profit under private remuneration. Those of you who will find Table 1 in the envelope at 
the beginning of the experiment will also be provided with Table 2 while those who will 
find Table 1a will also be provided with Table 2A. 
•  If you are in the joint remuneration mode, your profit is determined by the average effort 
by you and the other group member, multiplied by 8 ECU, minus the cost of your individ-
ual effort in ECU. 
Your total profit for the experiment equals the sum of your profits over the 30 periods. 
At the end of the experiment, your total profit will be converted to Canadian dollars with a 
conversion rate of 50 cents per 100 ECU. 
Available information 
At the end of the first stage of each period, you are told whether you are in private or joint 
remuneration mode. 
At the beginning of each period (except for the first one), you are informed of your result in 
the previous period. This includes the remuneration mode that you chose, the remuneration 
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mode that the other chose, the effective remuneration mode, your individual effort, the aver-
age effort in the joint remuneration mode (if applicable), your effort cost, your profit and your 
cumulated profit over all previous periods.  
At any time, by clicking on the magnifying glass icon on your screen, you can access a table 
of your results in all previous periods. The table shows the results of the first period in the top 
line and the results of subsequent periods underneath. 
Before we begin the experiment, we ask you to answer some comprehension questions re-
garding these instructions. Everybody must answer all of the questions correctly before we 
carry on.  
Thank you for your participation! 
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Table A-1 
Individual effort cost (Effort level squared and divided by 10) 
Effort level  Effort cost  Effort level  Effort cost 
1  0.10  51  260.10 
2  0.40  52  270.40 
3  0.90  53  280.90 
4  1.60  54  291.60 
5  2.50  55  302.50 
6  3.60  56  313.60 
7  4.90  57  624.90 
8  6.40  58  336.40 
9  8.10  59  348.10 
10  10.00  60  360.00 
11  12.10  61  372.10 
12  14.40  62  384.40 
13  16.90  63  396.90 
14  19.60  64  409.60 
15  22.50  65  422.50 
16  25.60  66  435.60 
17  28.90  67  448.90 
18  32.40  68  462.40 
19  36.10  69  476.10 
20  40.00  70  490.00 
21  44.10  71  504.10 
22  48.40  72  518.40 
23  52.90  73  532.90 
24  57.60  74  547.60 
25  62.50  75  562.50 
26  67.60  76  577.60 
27  72.90  77  592.90 
28  78.40  78  608.40 
29  84.10  79  624.10 
30  90.00  80  640.00 
31  96.10  81  656.10 
32  102.40  82  672.40 
33  108.90  83  688.90 
34  115.60  84  705.60 
35  122.50  85  722.50 
36  129.60  86  739.60 
37  136.90  87  756.90 
38  144.40  88  774.40 
39  152.10  89  792.10 
40  160.00  90  810.00 
41  168.10  91  828.10 
42  176.40  92  846.40 
43  184.90  93  864.90 
44  193.60  94  883.60 
45  202.50  95  802.50 
46  211.60  96  921.60 
47  220.90  97  940.90 
48  230.40  98  960.40 
49  240.10  99  980.10 
50  250.00  100  1000.00 
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Table A-1A 
Individual effort cost (Effort level squared and divided by 8) 
Effort level  Effort cost  Effort level  Effort cost 
1  0.13  51  325.13 
2  0.50  52  338.00 
3  1.13  53  351.13 
4  2.00  54  364.50 
5  3.13  55  378.13 
6  4.50  56  392.00 
7  6.13  57  406.13 
8  8.00  58  420.50 
9  10.13  59  435.13 
10  12.50  60  450.00 
11  15.13  61  465.13 
12  18.00  62  480.50 
13  21.13  63  496.13 
14  24.50  64  512.00 
15  28.13  65  528.13 
16  32.00  66  544.50 
17  36.13  67  561.13 
18  40.50  68  578.00 
19  45.13  69  595.13 
20  50.00  70  612.50 
21  55.13  71  630.13 
22  60.50  72  648.00 
23  66.13  73  666.13 
24  72.00  74  684.50 
25  78.13  75  703.13 
26  84.50  76  722.00 
27  91.13  77  741.13 
28  98.00  78  760.50 
29  105.13  79  780.13 
30  112.50  80  800.00 
31  120.13  81  820.13 
32  128.00  82  840.50 
33  136.13  83  861.13 
34  144.50  84  882.00 
35  153.13  85  903.13 
36  162.00  86  924.50 
37  171.13  87  946.13 
38  180.50  88  968.00 
39  190.13  89  990.13 
40  200.00  90  1012.50 
41  210.13  91  1035.13 
42  220.50  92  1058.00 
43  231.13  93  1081.13 
44  242.00  94  1104.50 
45  253.13  95  1128.13 
46  264.50  96  1152.00 
47  276.13  97  1176.13 
48  288.00  98  1200.50 
49  300.13  99  1225.13 
50  312.50  100  1250.00 
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Table A-2 
Profit in the private mode (Cost equals squared effort level divided by 10) 
Effort level  Effort cost  Profit  Effort level  Effort cost  Profit 
1  0.10 6.90  51  260.10 96.90 
2  0.40 13.60  52  270.40 93.60 
3  0.90 20.10  53  280.90 90.10 
4  1.60 26.40  54  291.60 86.40 
5  2.50 32.50  55  302.50 82.50 
6  3.60 38.40  56  313.60 78.40 
7  4.90 44.10  57  624.90 74.10 
8  6.40 49.60  58  336.40 69.60 
9  8.10 54.90  59  348.10 64.90 
10  10.00 60.00  60  360.00 60.00 
11  12.10 64.90  61  372.10 54.90 
12  14.40 69.60  62  384.40 49.60 
13  16.90 74.10  63  396.90 44.10 
14  19.60 78.40  64  409.60 38.40 
15  22.50 82.50  65  422.50 32.50 
16  25.60 86.40  66  435.60 26.40 
17  28.90 90.10  67  448.90 20.10 
18  32.40 93.60  68  462.40 13.60 
19  36.10 96.90  69  476.10 6.90 
20  40.00 100.00  70  490.00 0.00 
21  44.10 102.90  71  504.10 -7.10 
22  48.40 105.60  72  518.40 -14.40 
23  52.90 108.10  73  532.90 -21.90 
24  57.60 110.40  74  547.60 -29.60 
25  62.50 112.50  75  562.50 -37.50 
26  67.60 114.40  76  577.60 -45.60 
27  72.90 116.10  77  592.90 -53.90 
28  78.40 117.60  78  608.40 -62.40 
29  84.10 118.90  79  624.10 -71.10 
30  90.00 120.00  80  640.00 -80.00 
31  96.10 120.90  81  656.10 -89.10 
32  102.40 121.60  82  672.40 -98.40 
33  108.90 122.10  83  688.90 -107.60 
34  115.60 122.40  84  705.60 -117.60 
35  122.50 122.50  85  722.50 -127.50 
36  129.60 122.40  86  739.60 -137.60 
37  136.90 122.10  87  756.90 -147.90 
38  144.40 121.60  88  774.40 -158.40 
39  152.10 120.90  89  792.10 -169.10 
40  160.00 120.00  90  810.00 -180.00 
41  168.10 118.90  91  828.10 -191.10 
42  176.40 117.60  92  846.40 -202.40 
43  184.90 116.10  93  864.90 -213.90 
44  193.60 114.40  94  883.60 -225.60 
45  202.50 112.50  95  802.50 -237.50 
46  211.60 110.40  96  921.60 -249.60 
47  220.90 108.10  97  940.90 -261.90 
48  230.40 105.60  98  960.40 -274.40 
49  240.10 102.90  99  980.10 -287.10 
50  250.00 100.00  100  1000.00 -300.00 
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Table A-2A 
Profit in the private mode (Cost equals squared effort level divided by 8) 
Effort level  Effort cost  Profit  Effort level  Effort cost  Profit 
1  0.13 6.88  51  325.13 31.88 
2  0.50 13.50  52  338.00 26.00 
3  1.13 19.88  53  351.13 19.88 
4  2.00 26.00  54  364.50 13.50 
5  3.13 31.88  55  378.13 6.88 
6  4.50 37.50  56  392.00 0.00 
7  6.13 42.88  57  406.13 -7.13 
8  8.00 48.00  58  420.50 -14.50 
9  10.13 52.88  59  435.13 -22.13 
10  12.50 57.50  60  450.00 -30.00 
11  15.13 61.88  61  465.13 -38.13 
12  18.00 66.00  62  480.50 -46.50 
13  21.13 69.88  63  496.13 -55.13 
14  24.50 73.50  64  512.00 -64.00 
15  28.13 76.88  65  528.13 -73.13 
16  32.00 80.00  66  544.50 -82.50 
17  36.13 82.88  67  561.13 -92.13 
18  40.50 85.50  68  578.00 -102.00 
19  45.13 87.88  69  595.13 -112.13 
20  50.00 90.00  70  612.50 -122.50 
21  55.13 91.88  71  630.13 -133.13 
22  60.50 93.50  72  648.00 -144.00 
23  66.13 94.88  73  666.13 -155.13 
24  72.00 96.00  74  684.50 -166.50 
25  78.13 96.88  75  703.13 -178.13 
26  84.50 97.50  76  722.00 -190.00 
27  91.13 97.88  77  741.13 -202.13 
28  98.00 98.00  78  760.50 -214.50 
29  105.13 97.88  79  780.13 -227.13 
30  112.50 97.50  80  800.00 -240.00 
31  120.13 96.88  81  820.13 -253.13 
32  128.00 96.00  82  840.50 -266.50 
33  136.13 94.88  83  861.13 -280.13 
34  144.50 93.50  84  882.00 -294.00 
35  153.13 91.88  85  903.13 -308.13 
36  162.00 90.00  86  924.50 -322.50 
37  171.13 87.88  87  946.13 -337.13 
38  180.50 85.50  88  968.00 -352.00 
39  190.13 82.88  89  990.13 -367.13 
40  200.00 80.00  90  1012.50 -382.50 
41  210.13 76.88  91  1035.13 -398.13 
42  220.50 73.50  92  1058.00 -414.00 
43  231.13 69.88  93  1081.13 -430.13 
44  242.00 66.00  94  1104.50 -446.50 
45  253.13 61.88  95  1128.13 -463.13 
46  264.50 57.50  96  1152.00 -480.00 
47  276.13 52.88  97  1176.13 -497.13 
48  288.00 48.00  98  1200.50 -514.50 
49  300.13 42.88  99  1225.13 -532.13 
50  312.50 37.50  100  1250.00 -550.00 
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